Escribe: Nick Davenport, Presidente de Eispartner
Texto original integro en inglés a continuación del resumen en español)
Nos cuenta Nick cómo dos grandes Compañías de seguros del Reino Unido, AVIVA y RSA (Royal and Sun Alliance) han enfurecido a los inversores por el recorte profundo de su dividendo, de repente y sin previo aviso.
Dice Nick que quizás para los inversores de otros países no parece que sea de tanta importancia como para estremecer a todo el mundo. Sin embargo estas dos Compañías han sido partners muy aburridos. A cambio de una política de poca atención a la fluctuación de la acción pagaban altos dividendos que en algunos ejercicios llegó a alrededor del 8%.
La cotización de AVIVA que llegó a estar en las alturas de las 10 Libras hace una década languidece en estos momentos en menos de 3 €; RSA no se ha movido de 1,20 € a pesar de sus fusiones.
Actualmente son mejores inversiones los bonos del Gobierno y de ahí la ira de los inversores británicos. Además muchos planes de pensiones y seguros de amortización de hipoteca (morgages) con la cláusula “with profit” ven cómo estos esperan mejores tiempos.
Los nuevos jefes de las aseguradoras argumentan que necesitan dinero su planes de expansión lo cual no deja de ser un mal chiste porque en los últimos tiempos han tenido que dar marcha atrás de planes de expansión fracasados. ¡Demuestran actuar con un alto cinismo al no explicar que muchas aventuras expansivas les han costado verdaderas fortunas en siniestros como por ejemplo los relacionados con el amianto.
En términos generales se puede afirmar que mientras AXA y Allianz o incluso Mapfre, han consolidado su presencia mundial, siendo líderes indiscutidos, mientras que las Compañías británicas no son ni sombra de lo que fueron antes de los 90. Les ha faltado visión a largo plazo y una gestión más eficaz.
Nick se pregunta qué ha podido salir mal en la gestión, contestando que los gestores se entusiasmaron por modelos de mercados al por mayor más atractivos y emocionantes para después abandonarlos sin explicaciones lo cual se paga. Los corredores y clientes no olvidan y pasan factura.
Concluye Nick que ambas Compañías si no fuera por importantes partidas de pasivo potencialmente dudosas ya habrían sido objetivo de adquisición de alguna Compañía continental.
Y todo esto no deja de ser una pena para los consumidores que ven cómo se reduce una oferta diversa y competitiva porque cada vez desaparecen más Compañías y se avanza un auténtico cartel controlado por pocas Compañías y apoyado por una estrategia legislativa errónea de Bruselas, un tema que algún día habrá que analizar aquí.
Texto original íntegro en inglés a continuación:
Two large general insurers in the UK, Aviva (ex- Commercial Union/Norwich Union) and RSA (Royal and Sun Alliance) have recently enraged stock market investors by deeply cutting their dividend, suddenly and without warning.
To outsiders, this might not seem to be an event of world-shattering significance. These two large insurers have been very dull performers, their stock prices immobile for some years (Aviva reached the giddy heights of £10 per share less than a decade ago, but now languishes at under £3). RSA has not moved much from £1.20 since the merger of its culturally conflicting component parts, the traditional Northern Royal and the more adventurous Sun Alliance.
The only redeeming feature of the two insurers as investments was the yield on their shares, somewhere around 8%, which made them a core “hold” for a very large number of investment funds. Given that cash and government bonds have returned hardly better than 2% and with inflation averaging 3%, the two “safe” insurers seemed an excellent anchor for a defensive equity investment portfolio – hence the anger provoked by the dividend cuts.
What is more, many personal pensions and mortgages in the UK include investment products (for example “with profits” – what profits? – life policies) from Aviva, whose performance has not yet recovered from the previous recession, let alone the current one.
The argument given by another crop of new Chief Executives is that the insurers need the cash saved by cutting the dividend in order to invest in expansion. Investors regard this with deep cynicism, given the poor track record of both groups in their international operations. The two insurers have been consistently out-boxed and out-smarted by their European competitors AXA and Allianz, and in recent times Mapfre. International efforts have been focused on the USA and the ex-colonies Canada, South Africa and Australia. The USA (asbestos and long-tail liability business generally) has cost them billions, and the other Anglophone markets are over-populated and viciously competitive with the result that margins are tight.
Back in 1973 when the UK joined the European Economic Community, one of its industries most expected to succeed was Insurance. The UK then had a number of very strong “composite” insurers (both life and general). Even at the time of the conception of the Single Market in 1992, by when Claude Bébéar had already started his inspired series of acquisitions (Drouot and the Groupe de Paris) and created AXA, there was still an opportunity for the UK insurers to sit at the same table. Bébéar was then to bring off his greatest coup, buying the seemingly impregnable UAP (“Numéro 1 oblige”) in 1996 and going on to acquire the third great UK composite Guardian Royal Exchange in 1999. Allianz took a longer term view than that allowed by the short-termist London stock market and grew organically and by shrewd acquisition. German insurers benefited (in theory they no longer can) from accumulated “equalisation reserves”, funds which the British companies would have been forced to pay out to shareholders.
What went wrong? Firstly, and despite the fact that they used to have good presence on the ground in Europe as a base, management shirked imaginative M&A strategies. Typically, the top managers were either accountants or career insurers from the North of England who had had no need to speak other languages and no impulsion to familiarise themselves with other legal systems. Much of the International talent in the UK was attracted to the more exciting and rewarding wholesale market in Lloyd’s. Expansion strategies were launched and then retracted when returns proved inadequate – a disastrous mistake in Continental markets which value continuity and where spurned brokers and customers have long memories.
